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This is the first paper that explores Fisher, Shah and Titman’s (2016) average ranking approach 
for the value and momentum strategy in the Nordic equity market offering an exceptional 
experimental environment. Our results indicate that in the Nordic stock markets, the value 
anomaly offered excess returns in the 1993 to 2017 sample period only when small stocks were a 
part of the portfolio, whereas the momentum effect is strong and significant, irrespective of size. 
Interestingly, our findings also indicate that the negative correlation between value and 
momentum (Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen, 2013) seems to be driven by growth stocks: 
Winner stocks that are value stocks generated 1.66% per month on average, whereas winner 
stocks that are growth stocks exhibit virtually the same average payoff. On the other hand, the 
spread between value and growth stocks that are loser stocks is on average 0.97% per month.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
In the 21st century, value investing has become increasingly popular. The finance industry offers 
mutual funds, ETFs and hedge funds that fixate merely on value investing. The principle behind 
this fixation is the value premium. Many financial institutions have also funds exploiting the 
momentum effect. There are even funds that combine both strategies into one product, such as 
AQR’s International multi style fund.1 The reason for why such funds have gained huge 
popularity among investors is the empirical evidence that value stocks have outperformed growth 
stocks in the past while at the same time winner stocks have beaten loser stocks. 
 Earlier studies have suggested that value and momentum strategies earn abnormal risk-
adjusted returns (Stattman 1980, Jegadeesh and Titman 1993). Most of the prior studies have 
concentrated on showing the existence of value and momentum anomalies separately. On the 
other hand, in an early paper Asness (1997) discovered a negative correlation between value and 
momentum. Value was strongest among loser stocks, whereas momentum was strongest in 
growth stocks. Similar findings were documented in Daniel and Titman (1999). A negative 
correlation among two high-yielding anomalies possibly offers an opportunity to earn high 
returns at a relatively low portfolio risk. Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen (2013) studied the 
correlation and performance of value and momentum anomalies as well as the performance of 
combo strategies across eight asset classes and markets. They found significant negative 
correlations between value and momentum strategies; value and momentum earning excess 
returns in all investigated markets and asset classes except for Japan where momentum does not 
yield any significant payoffs. Especially a portfolio that combined both strategies improved the 
overall performance in terms of Sharpe ratio and performed remarkably well. They argue that the 
negative performance of the momentum strategy in Japan should not be viewed in solitude but in 
the context of value and momentum combination: In the selected time period, value performed 
exceptionally well in Japan. The study used extensive time series from 70s to the 2010s.2  
Furthermore, Fisher, Shah and Titman (2016) studied the portfolio implementation of 
momentum and value anomalies. Unlike Asness et al. (2013) they studied long-only portfolios in 
                                                           
1 See https://funds.aqr.com.  
2 Another paper that documents negative correlation between value and momentum is Cakici, Fabozzi and Tan 
(2013) who studied the size, value and momentum in 18 emerging markets and found strong evidence for value in 
all the markets and for momentum in all investigated markets excluding Eastern Europe. They also found that value 
and momentum are negatively correlated which is in line with previous studies. Their time period started from 
January 1990 and ended in December 2011 covering regions from Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe. 
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U.S. stock market covering a sample from 1975 to 2013 and used several approaches to combine 
the anomalies into long-only portfolios. All of the approaches increased Sharpe ratios in 
comparison to the market in both small and large stocks. Their study shows that more 
sophisticated combination portfolios outperformed the simple 50/50 combination proposed in 
Asness et al. (2013). While there is a wide strand of finance literature that explores emerging 
markets, there are surprisingly few studies available focusing on the Nordic stock markets. One 
paper that is relevant to our study is that of Leivo (2012), who explored the Finnish stock market 
data, covering the period 1993 to 2009 and found that enhancing value by incorporating 
momentum improves most of the traditional value-only portfolios. However, he found that 
including momentum metrics into the portfolios increases the asymmetry of return distribution in 
an undesirable manner for investors.3 
 The purpose of this paper is to investigate the profitability of combined value and 
momentum strategies using mainly blue chips in the Nordic countries. Using a long sample 
period of 25 years, covering data from 1993 to 2017, the current research attempts to uncover 
ideal portfolio implementation techniques that will potentially improve the risk-return profiles of 
simple pure-play value or momentum strategies. Thereby, it is also investigated which strategies 
generate the highest raw returns and risk-adjusted returns. Since stocks in the Nordic equity 
markets are not only euro but also in Swedish crones, Norwegian crones and Danish crones, all 
stocks are adjusted for the corresponding exchange rates and converted into euro. Finally, this 
study explores also what may be the underlying driver of the correlation structure between value 
and momentum by making use of double-sorted portfolios. 
 The current research contributes to the literature by focusing exclusively on the Nordic 
stock markets that involve very different features compared to the U.S. equity market. Fama and 
French (2008) underline the importance of examining whether anomalies are pervasive across 
size groups, for instance. Such statements make it surprising that no study has yet been 
                                                           
3 Other relevant papers that investigate the profitability of strategies combining value and momentum are Bird and 
Whitaker (2004) and Bird and Casavecchia (2007). Bird and Whitaker (2004) discovered that the value anomaly can 
be significantly improved with a combination of momentum while adding dispersion to the strategy improves the 
pay offs even more. They argue that their findings affirm that many stocks go through a cycle similarly as Lee and 
Swaminathan (2000) suggest. The time period that they considered covered a sample from 1990 to 2002 and 
accounting for German, French, Italian, Dutch, Spanish, Swiss and British stock markets. On the other hand, Bird 
and Casavecchia (2007) studied whether value strategies could be enhanced using momentum indicators to time 
stock purchases. The study employed a sample running from 1989 to 2004 and European data. Confirming earlier 
studies, they found that that value strategies could be considerably enhanced.  
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undertaken to investigate the payoffs of combined value and momentum strategies in periphery 
markets involving highly developed economies such as the Nordic equity markets. The same 
argument as raised in Grobys (2016, p.3) is also valid in the context of our study: we view the 
Nordic equity market setting as an exceptional experimental environment controlled ex ante for 
industrialization and liquidity. In doing so, we extend Leivo’s (2012) study as we also account 
for the Swedish, Norwegian and Danish stock markets, and we expand the data series 
incorporating eight years of more data. Furthermore, our study also complements Fisher et al. 
(2016) and by investigating not only long-only strategies but also zero-cost portfolios 
incorporating short legs while it also extends Asness et al. (2013) by employing double-sorted 
portfolios to reveal what may be the underlying driver of the negative correlation between value 
and momentum. While long-only strategies are perhaps more relevant for the mutual funds 
industry and retail investors, zero-cost strategies are typically employed in the hedge-funds 
industry. Finally, our paper adds to the wide strand of literature investigating the profitability of 
strategies combining value and momentum (Bird and Whitaker, 2004; Bird and Casavecchia, 
2007; Leivo, 2012; Asness et al., 2013).      
 Our results indicate that in the Nordic stock markets, the value anomaly offered excess 
returns in the 1993 to 2017 sample period only when small stocks were a part of the portfolio. 
When implemented among the largest companies, the average payoff of the zero-cost strategy 
drops from 1.25% per month to 0.44% per month and does not reach statistical significance on a 
common 5% level. Confirming earlier studies, the momentum anomaly generates raw excess 
returns corresponding to 1.72% per month when all stocks are included and 0.86% per month 
when implementing this strategy among large stocks only. Both average payoffs are statistically 
significant even on a 1% significance level. Confirming Asness at al. (2013), using a simple 
50/50 allocation strategy between value and momentum increases Sharpe ratios significantly. 
Interestingly, our double-sorting approach indicates that the negative correlation seems to be 
driven by growth stocks: Winner stocks that are value stocks generate 1.66% per month on 
average, whereas winner stocks that are growth stocks exhibit virtually the same average payoff. 
However, the spread between value and growth stocks in the loser group is on average 0.97% per 
month. Finally, we find that Fisher et al.’s (2016) recently proposed average ranking method 
implemented among large stocks generates excess returns corresponding to 1.60% per month 
with a Newey-West (1987) t-statistic of 7.01 indicating statistical significance on any level. We 
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find that, in terms of Sharpe ratio and Sortino ratio, this strategy can be considered superior. 
Since we investigate mainly large stocks and, by this, implicitly control for liquidity, our results 
may be also of interest for practitioners in the finance industry. 
  Our paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes the features of the 
Nordic equity markets. The third section describes the empirical setting. The fourth section 
presents the results and the last section provides concluding remarks.  
 
 
2. NORDIC STOCK MARKETS 
Compared to the U.S. equity market, the Nordic stock market is relatively new; yet developed 
equity market. The market consists of five countries: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and 
Sweden. Following earlier studies, we do not account for Icelandic stocks as Iceland is the 
smallest equity market in terms of market capitalization and therefore often excluded in 
empirical studies. Foreign ownership of the Nordic stock markets has risen significantly from the 
early 90ties as the economies have developed and stock markets have become more active in 
both pure number of stocks and trading volume. These markets are sometimes even referred to as 
periphery markets which refer to stock markets that are on the outskirt of the investment horizon. 
A feature of periphery markets is that at times they are highly volatile as in times of distress 
investors pull their money away from these markets first; which is a side effect of the flight to 
safety. Nowadays, Nordic countries are often considered part of the European core, although the 
shift in foreign ownership during crises implies that they still experience some peripheral 
qualities.  
Nordic stock markets started to develop rapidly in the 90ties when the economies started 
growing at a faster pace. As young but liquid stock markets and exhibiting a low risk 
environment, the Nordic stock markets offer an interesting opportunity to broaden equity market 
studies outside of the traditional U.S. scope. Furthermore, compared to emerging market 
economies, for instance, the Nordic countries have been offering stable political environments 
with low risk profiles. Moreover, the bond yields of Nordic countries have been very close to 
U.S. bond yields which is not the case with many other periphery or developing markets: Nordic 
countries have held constantly a triple-A credit rating with the exception of Finland which is 
currently rated at the same level as the U.S. Some might even argue that the Nordic stock 
6 
 
markets are less risky from this standpoint than the U.S.. While the U.S. has been downgraded to 
the double-A, Denmark, Norway and Sweden still hold triple-A rating. Finally, the Nordic 
countries are also low in corruption and the stock markets have a relatively high level of 
liquidity.4  
While there is a wide strand of research in emerging market economies, surprisingly little 
attention has been paid to investigating the Nordic stock markets. As pointed in Fama and French 
(2008), equity market phenomena can be sample-specific and therefore it is important to explore 
those phenomena in other markets than the U.S. Nordic stock markets offer an excellent 
opportunity as they are rapidly growing equity markets with increasing liquidity, high level of 
globalization involving a flourishing export industry, but at the same time they offer lower levels 
of risk compared to emerging markets.  
 
 
3. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
The data is compiled with OMXH, OMXSPI, OSEBX and OMXC main listed companies’ 
historical returns and financials from January 1991 to December 2017. All stocks that are traded 
in First North or in other non-main list market places are excluded from the sample. Stocks listed 
at the Icelandic stock exchange are excluded due to the low amount of traded stocks, trading 
volume and especially the market capitalizations of those companies. The period that portfolios 
are held starts from January 1993 and ends at December 2017. From a practical investment 
perspective, this 25-year period presents the vast majority of the time horizon when Nordic stock 
markets have been large and active enough for large overseas investors (Leivo, 2012).  
If a stock is delisted it will be sold at the closing price of its last trading day. If a stock 
has gone bankrupt the return on it will be minus 100 percent. The dividends are reinvested to the 
same stock, eliminating biases arriving from different dividend yields between stocks. The total 
number of stocks in the sample is high, over 2000 (see Table A.1 in the appendix), due to the fact 
that all of the stocks that have been traded in the period are included in the sample to provide the 
best possible real-life investment scenario. This procedure eliminates the survivor bias which 
would tilt the results to be perhaps more favorable, especially, in a smaller market setting. The 
large variance in the number of companies, as shown in Table A.1, is explained by the low 
                                                           
4 See https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview. 
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number of stocks in the early 90ties and the rapid development of Nordic stock markets. Sweden 
is the largest market as it accounts for almost half of the average number of companies as well as 
the total market values. Unlike Leivo’s (2012) study, Swedish stocks may be the core driver of 
our results. 
This unique set of stocks from several countries collected into one basket offers a liquid 
set of securities that can actually be traded. Stock returns and market caps from Swedish, Danish 
and Norwegian companies are converted to euros using month-end exchange rates that are 
derived from Bloomberg. This approach gives actual returns that investor would have been able 
to generate. The developments of the corresponding exchange rates are provided in Figure A.1 in 
the appendix. As it is common practice, financial companies and stocks that are not primary 
listed in the Nordic exchanges are excluded from the sample; for example if they have primary 
listing in London but have dual listing in Oslo.  
 While value portfolios are based on their P/B ratios, momentum portfolios are based on 
their past 12-months total shareholder return excluding the last month (see Asness et al., 2013).5 
Furthermore, as a risk-free rate 6-month interbank offered rate is used. Specifically, this study 
employs an average of 6-month Euribor, Stibor, Nibor and Cibor. For the periods prior Euribor, 
6-month Helibor is used as a risk-free rate for the Finnish equity market. This method gives the 
best proxy for a risk-free rate to an investor who invests in the Nordic stock market.6 
Additionally, a 6-month rate is used instead of a 3-month rate in order to avoid months with 
negative risk-free rates. Using the 6-month rate gives also a slightly higher average risk-free rate 
than using the 3-month rate which means that our results are somewhat more conservative. 
Figure A.2 in the appendix reveals that the Nordic IBOR-rates have been higher compared to the 
U.S. T-Bills, with the exception of the most recent years and the years prior to the financial 
crisis. It is also noteworthy that the Nordic rates are highly positively correlated with the 
exception of Norway which has its own special circumstances due to the impact of oil price, 
although it does not differ dramatically from the other rates. Finally, from these IBOR-rates, an 
average is formed which is used as a risk-free rate in this study. 
                                                           
5 Using total shareholder return instead of simple share price performance avoids unnecessary trading created from 
large dividend payments creating false signals as share price should drop the amount of dividend paid. This should 
not have a major impact on the momentum signals but it will avoid repelling stocks with high dividend yields. 
6 Especially in the early 90s, the markets had higher interest rates and therefore higher risk profiles than e.g. U.S. 
market. Due to this, the country average of 6-month interbank offered rate is preferred to U.S. T-Bill that has been 
used in some country basket studies in previous academic research. 
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 Further, price-to-book ratios are calculated as the latest share price divided by the last 
year’s actual reported book value per share. The book values are considered to be from last year 
on the first of July in order to avoid any ahead look biases. Share price data, risk-free rates, stock 
index returns, foreign exchange rates, market caps and price-to-book ratios are derived from 
Bloomberg’s database. The investment horizon is from 1993 to 2017 corresponding to 25 years 
of monthly data. This time period includes several market cycles and sentiments offering a 
comprehensive dataset for research. During the period, the Nordic stock markets have evolved 
and grown in size as well as experienced turmoil from the tech bubble in the turn of the century 
to the financial crisis in the later sample. In the final data sample from which the combination 
portfolios are created the portfolios hold only the top third of the largest stocks based on the 
market capitalization. This leads to a dataset where the smallest stock in the sample is 65 M€ in 
market capitalization and, on average, all companies are above 175 M€ in market capitalization. 
This leads to a liquid set of securities, although there may be some short sales constraints in 
medium-sized stocks. This matter is discussed in following chapters. 
 When constructing portfolios, the aforementioned parameters are used, that is, top and 
bottom thirds are used as limits for value and growth as well as winners and losers stocks. The 
portfolios are then rebalanced at the beginning of each month. In a similar manner to risk-free 
rates, a combined market index is created using all-share indexes from OMX Helsinki, 
Stockholm, Oslo, and Copenhagen. The returns are total shareholder returns where dividends 
have been reinvested in a similar manner as in portfolios created in this study. The returns of 
individual country indexes are additionally value-weighted to avoid bias from having a too high 
portion of the returns from smaller countries. It is important to note that the indices will have 
returns also from the smaller stocks, hence creating larger returns compared to an index 
compiled from only the largest stocks in the market. Again, our conservative approach creates a 
larger hurdle to surpass for the (combined) portfolios investigated in this study.  
In line with the earlier literature, portfolio performance is measured by Sharpe ratio and 
Sortino ratio. Also, absolute returns are presented and compared as well as risk-adjusted returns 
measured by the Capital Asset Pricing Model. The performance of the formed value and 
momentum combination portfolios are compared to the combined index as well as simple 
separate value and momentum portfolios.  
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In addition to pure play value and momentum portfolios, several types of value and 
momentum combination portfolios are created: 
(1) 50/50: half of the portfolio invested in momentum and the other half in value. 
(2) Double screening: stocks that indicate both value and momentum signals (in the top 50% 
for both strategies for the long leg, and in the bottom 50% for both strategies for short 
leg). 
(3) Ranking scheme: ranking stocks based on value and momentum and taking the average 
of the scores (long for top third and short for lowest third) 
Every portfolio will be constructed as long-only and long-short portfolio; hence the number of 
portfolios will be treble to the strategies presented above plus the pure-play value and 
momentum portfolios. Long-only is studied conservatively due to the fact that only large stocks 
are included in the sample. The large cap tiers are adjusted monthly so if a stock has been in the 
portfolio but the share price declines, it may be sold if the drop-in share price causes the stock to 
fall below the top 50% in market capitalization. This procedure offers an even more liquid set of 
securities reducing short-sales constraints and transaction costs compared to small cap stocks. 
Additionally, returns are then equal-weighted creating a liquid set of returns and leaving very 
little room for short sales constraints, high trading costs or non-viable trades. Later on we will 
see that equal-weighting additionally supports momentum while diminishing value payoffs. 
Value-weighted returns are not investigated due to very large stocks causing massive bias.  
Instead of using value-weighted returns, equal-weighted returns are employed due to the 
fact that in the Nordic stock markets there are not that many very large companies and their 
returns would dominate when making use of value weighted returns. For example, in the early 
2000s, Nokia’s market cap was more than 25% of the total market value of all stocks in the 
Nordic stock market. This creates situations where one stock’s weight is more than half of the 
long or short leg portfolio, implying that the portfolio’s performance would be almost solely 
driven by one stock. Hence, the current research focuses on equal-weighted returns because it 
provides the best representation of the returns that could actually have been achieved. Similarly, 
equal-weighted returns have been used in other Nordic stock market studies (Davydov, Tikkanen 
and Äijö, 2016, Leivo and Pätäri, 2009; Leivo, 2012). However, our study accounts for the size 




To avoid a small-firm bias, only larger stocks are included in the sample when comparing 
the best combination strategies. However, in pure-play value and momentum portfolios also 
smaller stocks are included to show the effect that size has to value and momentum strategies. 
The conservative approach of using only the large stock is then applied when studying the best-
in-class value and momentum combinations. To adjust for possible autocorrelation and 




Firstly, we expect that we are able to confirm earlier studies by revealing the existence of a value 
and momentum premium in our Nordic market setting. Secondly, we expect that a 50/50 
combination of the two strategies (Asness et al., 2013) and an average ranking method (Fisher et 
al., 2016) will outperform value-only and momentum-only strategies. However, it is unclear 
which one of those combination strategies will produce the highest risk-adjusted returns. Further, 
all combination portfolios are also expected to outperform the market measured by our combined 
country index.  
 
4.1. Pure-play momentum and value strategies 
The momentum strategy offered significant excess returns in the Nordic stock market during the 
period. Although momentum performed well, Figure 1 shows that the strategy suffered some 
severe crashes during the period, as it has been identified by earlier research (Barroso and Santa-
Clara, 2015; Daniel and Moskowitz, 2016; Grobys, 2016).  
The results reported in Panel A and B of Table 1 show that the winner-minus-loser 
portfolios offer highly significant average payoffs for both samples all-stocks and large stocks. 
The results are significant on at least 5% level. Moreover, comparing Panel B with Panel A of 
Table 1 shows that the Sharpe ratio even increases in large-stock portfolios compared to all-
stocks, although it delivers lower alpha and Sortino ratio. This is due to the relatively higher 
volatility of the all-stocks momentum portfolio. As the Sortino ratio does not account for the 
upside risk, it does not increase when we move to the large-stocks only portfolio. The 
momentum strategy is tilted towards growth as the P/B ratio of the winner-portfolio is 7.2, on 
average, whereas the corresponding figure for the loser-portfolio is estimated at only 3.7 in the 
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top third portfolio. In the all-stocks portfolio the difference is even larger as the winner-portfolio 
has over triple the P/B ratios of the loser-portfolio, although now the ratios are a lot lower, 
winners having 2.1 and losers having 0.7, on average. 
 Furthermore, the results reported in Panel A of table 2 indicate that the value anomaly 
offered excess returns in the Nordic stock market over our 25 years sample period when small 
stocks were a part of the portfolio. On the other hand, the results reported in Panel B of table 2 
provide evidence that after accounting for size, the returns were significantly lower: Even though 
the value anomaly yielded impressive returns corresponding to 1.25% per month in the whole 
sample period, Figure 1 also shows that it suffered long periods of low returns which can be one 
of the reasons why investors avoid value strategies (Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). Our 
results imply that the value anomaly seems to be partially driven by small stocks as equally 
weighted returns of the whole sample offer significantly higher returns compared to the universe 
of stocks that are in the top third by market capitalization. The zero-cost value minus growth 
portfolios generated high Sharpe ratios corresponding to 1.11 and 0.44, respectively.  
 
4.2. 50/50 combination portfolio 
The correlation matrix between momentum and value strategies for the top third largest 
companies is reported in Table A.2. in the appendix. Confirming earlier studies, the correlation 
between the zero-cost value and momentum portfolios over the sample period is negative with a 
point estimate of -0.43 which is close to the corresponding point estimate of -0.53 reported in 
Table 2 in Asness et al. (2013) for the U.S.. Furthermore, using a very simple 50/50 allocation 
between the aforementioned value and momentum portfolios increases Sharpe ratios 
significantly as the negative correlation between the strategies reduces the standard deviation of 
the combined portfolio. The results are reported in Table 3 and Figure 1. The 50/50 combination 
clearly adds value as Sharpe and Sortino ratios improve considerably compared to pure-play 
strategies. The improvement of Sharpe ratios gives strong evidence that the combination of value 
and momentum indeed reduces the overall portfolio risk compared to individual value or 
momentum strategies, whereas the weak returns of the value strategy are compensated with high 
momentum returns. Interestingly, the results are similar to the corresponding results documented 
in Assnes et al. (2013) with respect to the Japanese stock market, though the roles between the 
hero and zero are reversed. The spread of the 50/50 portfolios are statistically significant at a 1% 
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level. Due to a lowered portfolio standard deviation, the robust t-statistics are higher than in 
either of the portfolios corresponding to the pure-play strategies.  
 
4.3. Double screening for value and momentum  
Asness at al. (2013) do not employ double sorts to investigate what is the underlying driver of 
the strategies’ negative correlation. Therefore, we explore this issue in detail. In doing so, we 
only employ the stocks in the top third of the market capitalization in order to exclude small 
stocks that do not exhibit reasonable levels of liquidity or might be subject to short sales 
constraints. While the previous analysis employed tercile sorts for setting the limits, in the 
following analysis the value and momentum limits are set to 50% in order to have enough stocks 
in the portfolios at all times because stocks must have both value and momentum signals to be 
included in the portfolio. That means, stocks are sorted based on momentum and value 
independently, that is, they are not firstly sorted based on value and then on momentum within 
the value stocks which would correspond to a dependent sorting approach.7 The results of the 
50%-limits portfolios are presented in Table 4. Combining value and momentum metrics into 
one portfolio increases returns significantly. We observe that the value and winner portfolio 
creates high average returns corresponding to 1.66% per month. Surprisingly, the growth and 
winner portfolio creates even slightly higher returns, corresponding to 1.68% per month, 
implying that momentum is the driver of the high average payoffs. It may be interesting to note 
that the returns of the two aforementioned portfolios are highly correlated throughout the sample 
period which is also noticeable by visual inspection of Figure 2 where the payoff evolutions of 
the portfolios reported in Table 4 are plotted against time. It is also worth noting that even the 
value and loser portfolio creates excess returns corresponding to 1.22% per month which is 
statistically significant on a 1% level.  
The worst performing portfolio is the growth and loser portfolio which yields even lower 
returns than the risk-free rate in our sample period offering interesting short sales opportunities. 
As we only account for large stocks exhibiting high levels of liquidity, this strategy would be 
implementable in real life also. Our findings may be consistent with Lee and Swaminathan 
(2000) who suggest that momentum experiences different cycles. Similar results were also found 
                                                           
7 The average number of included stocks in the portfolios is reported in table A.3. in the appendix. Table A.3. shows 
that this approach yields well diversified portfolios.  
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by Bird and Whitaker (2004) in major European stock markets accounting for a sample period 
from 1990 to 2002. Contrary to this study, they found that the most prolific long play would have 
been value and losers rather than value and winners.  
After controlling for the correlation with the market, the value and winner portfolio offers 
the highest average payoff corresponding to 0.72% per month which is statistically significant at 
a 1% significance level. Due to the correlation between value and loser stocks, the alpha is 
estimated at 0.18% per month and statistically not different from zero. The growth and winner 
portfolio delivers significant alpha and raw returns also. The economic magnitudes of the Sharpe 
and Sortino ratios are close to figures for the value and winner portfolio. Strikingly, the growth 
and loser portfolio creates statistically highly significant negative alpha corresponding to -0.88% 
per month. 
 
4.4. Average ranking method 
The average ranking method ranks stocks from 1 to 0 based on their ranking in price to book and 
cumulative past performance compared to the other stocks. Lowest price to book ratio (highest 
value) gets 1 and highest (lowest value) gets 0 and the stock that is in the median position in the 
sorted stocks sample gets 0.5 as ranking score. Similarly, highest cumulative past return gets the 
score of 1 and lowest gets 0. Then these ranks are added together and based on that score the top 
third of the companies creates a long portfolio (high rank) and lowest third creates a short 
portfolio (low rank).  
This procedure allows stocks to be part of the portfolio even if they do not have both 
signals but are high in another. It may also include stocks that are neither value nor momentum 
but score relatively high on both measures. In doing so, we extend the average ranking method 
proposed in Fisher et al. (2016) by constructing a short portfolio also. The advantage of this 
approach compared to double screening is that it lowers the portfolio turnover; hence it is not 
solely driven by momentum. Table 5 shows that implementing strategies based on average 
ranking value and momentum signals indeed yields significant excess returns. Again, we account 
for size by using only the top third of the largest stocks in our sample.  
From Table 5 we observe that the high minus low strategy generates average excess 
returns of 1.60% per month during the sample period with Sharpe and Sortino ratios 
corresponding to 1.81 and 16.44, respectively. Both measures are considerably higher than those 
14 
 
for the 50/50 portfolio reported in Panel B of Table 3. We find that the high-rank portfolio 
generates both high average raw payoff and alpha, corresponding to 1.85% per month and 0.90% 
per month, respectively, which are statistically significant at a 1% level.8 The time series 
evolutions of the portfolios reported in Table 5 are plotted in Figure A.3 in the appendix.9 
Moreover, the correlation matrix reported in Table A.3. in the appendix shows that all 
investment  vehicles are negatively correlated with the index but are highly positively correlated 
with each other.  
In the presence of short sales constraints, the returns from combination portfolios might 
be substantially reduced. Comparing the long-only portfolios, we find that the high rank portfolio 
exhibits a Sharpe ratio (e.g., 1.18) that is virtually the same as the one of the winner portfolio 
(e.g., 1.16), although it is worth noting that accounting for transaction costs would lower the 
winners portfolios’ returns. As a consequence, the ranking scheme portfolio appears to be 
superior. The average turnovers of different value and momentum portfolios documented in 
Fisher et al. (2016) indicate that momentum clearly has the highest turnover with both buy and 
sell thresholds with figures ranging between 104% to 157%, whereas value involves the lowest 
turnover with corresponding figures ranging between 20% and 31% which is in line with the 
common belief that value is a fast-moving signal and momentum a slow-moving one. Naturally, 
the 50/50 combo portfolio exhibits lower turnover than momentum and average ranking scheme 
accounting for turnovers ranging between 62% and 103%, whereas the average ranking scheme 








                                                           
8Note that growth stocks are, on average, larger in size than value stocks, and including only the largest third of the 
stocks in the portfolio decreases the probability of any short-sale constraints considerably.   
9 Fisher et al. (2016) documented that the average ranking method decreases portfolio turnover compared to 
momentum portfolio and therefore trading costs significantly, although it has a higher turnover compared to the 
50/50 portfolio that benefits from the low turnover of the value portfolio. Using thresholds in trading as in Fisher et 
al. (2016) would decrease the portfolio turnover even more. 
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4.5. Performance during the Global financial crisis 
Another interesting issue is to explore the performance of our proposed strategies during the 
financial crisis and the European debt crisis, respectively.10 Larry Elliott argues in his 
commentary Global financial crisis: five key stages 2007-2011 that the first phase of the global 
financial crisis began on 9 August 2007 with the seizure in the banking system precipitated by 
BNP Paribas announcing that it was ceasing activity in three hedge funds that specialised in US 
mortgage debt, whereas 9 May 2010 marked the point at which the focus of concern switched 
from the private sector to the public sector due to the severe problems in Greece.11 Since the 
financial crisis flowed into the European debt crisis, we consider the performance of our zero-
cost strategies during the sample period January 2008  ̶ December 2010.12 Since practitioners 
maybe mostly interested in large stocks, we focus in our analysis exclusively on stocks that are 
in the top-third in terms of market capitalization. In Table 6 we report the average payoffs of the 
50/50 combination portfolio, high rank–low rank zero-cost portfolio, and the value and winners–
growth and losers zero-cost portfolio using large stocks only. As it is from a practitioner’s point 
of view interesting to see how our proposed strategies performed relative to the 50/50 
combination benchmark portfolio, we also report the difference between those average payoffs 
and the 50/50 combination portfolio, which serves here as the benchmark strategy. From Table 6 
we observe that both the 50/50 combination portfolio and the high rank ̶ low rank zero-cost 
portfolio generate statistically significant payoffs, whereas the value and winners ̶ growth and 
losers zero-cost portfolio does not. Strikingly, the payoff differential between the high rank  ̶low 
rank and 50/50 combination portfolio is 0.71% per month and statistically significant on a 5% 
level. As a result, this additional robustness check supports our earlier findings even for the 
challenging period of the Global financial crisis, that is, the ranking scheme-based portfolio is 
superior in terms of its performance relative to the other strategies. 
                                                           
10 We are grateful for an anonymous reviewer to highlighting this issue. 
11 Larry Elliott is Economics editor of The Guardian and his article Global financial crisis: five key stages 2007-
2011was published online on Sunday 7 August 2011 16.49 BST. 
12 This sample period is in essence also covered in Grobys’ (2015) paper exploring the performance of different 
momentum strategies in the European Monetary Union during the financial crisis and European debt crisis. In his 
paper, however, he employs three different dummy variable models that have a crisis dummy having a value of zero 
either before the pre-January 2008 period or before the pre-January 2007 period or before the pre-January 2009 
period and a value of zero otherwise. However, his approach does not define the end of the crisis period and neither 
does it account for the issue that the financial crisis flowed into the European debt crisis. Our approach accounts for 






The popular momentum strategy yields significant excess returns in the Nordic stock market that 
are unrelated to size. The value strategy offers significant average payoffs but after accounting 
for size those returns decrease, implying that value premium is partly but not fully driven by a 
size effect in the Nordic stock market. Combining value and momentum increases Sharpe ratios 
and offers investors significant diversification benefits in the Nordic stock markets which is in 
line with previous studies (Asness et al., 2013; Fisher et al., 2016). All of the investigated 
combination portfolios improved the Sharpe ratios of pure-play strategies. Specifically, we found 
that the ranking scheme-based portfolio offered the best performance. All of the explored 
combination portfolios also exhibited higher raw returns than pure-play strategies except for the 
50/50 portfolio; though it had a higher Sharpe ratio than pure-play strategies due to reduced 
portfolio volatility.  
Further research could be done with additional momentum metrics, such as employing 
three-month or one-month past performance measures, additional value metrics, such as PE or 
EV/EBIT ratios, or even more exotic ways to combine the metrics. Additionally, analyst 
forecasts, profitability or asset growth could be analyzed to better understand the anomalies. This 
paper does not explicitly take into account trading costs but rather focuses on the highest gross 
returns within a liquid set of securities, although it is noted that, based on previous research, 
momentum experiences higher transaction costs than value. Future research could account for 
trading costs for the portfolios, e.g. based on the actual spreads for each specific stock at the date 
the trade is executed. Also, the scope of the research could be broadened to other markets and 
time periods. Neither does this paper account for the fact that some sophisticated momentum 
strategies, such as risk-managed momentum strategies (Barroso and Santa-Clara, 2015; Moreira 
and Muir, 2017; Grobys, 2018), could increase Sharpe ratios of the underlying simple strategy by 
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Table 1. Average payoffs of the momentum strategy 
Panel A. All stocks equally weighted 
 Winners Losers Winners minus losers 
Monthly return 2.47*** (3.56) 0.75 (1.54) 1.72*** (2.93) 
Monthly alpha 1.74** (2.54) -0.28 (-1.11) 2.01*** (2.99) 
STDEV 38.5 % 21.7 % 37.5 % 
Sharpe ratio 0.77 0.27 0.61 
Sortino ratio 12.42 1.67 8.89 
Portfolio beta 0.63 0.88 -0.25 
 
 
Panel B. Top third equally weighted 
 
 Winners Losers Winners minus losers 
Monthly return  1.95*** (4.61)    1.10*** (2.61) 0.86*** (3.57) 
Monthly alpha 0.92*** (4.46) -0.01 (-0.06) 0.93*** (4.21) 
STDEV 19.0 % 20.2 % 13.3 % 
Sharpe ratio 1.16    0.51 0.81 
Sortino ratio 7.34 3.02 4.72 
Portfolio beta 0.89 0.95 -0.06 
*** Statistically significant on a 1% level. 













Table 2. Average payoffs of the value strategy 
Panel A. All stocks equally weighted 
 
 Value Growth Value minus growth 
Monthly return  2.05*** (4.30) 0.80* (1.71) 1.25*** (4.12) 
Monthly alpha 1.16*** (4.02) -0.23 (-0.99) 1.39*** (4.95) 
STDEV 20.9 % 19.5 % 14.5 % 
Sharpe ratio 1.12 0.33 1.11 
Sortino ratio 9.17 1.85 9.87 
Portfolio beta 0.76 0.88 -0.12 
 
Panel B. Top third equally weighted 
 
 Value Growth Value minus growth 
Monthly return  1.50*** (3.69)  1.06** (2.28) 0.44  (1.50)  
Monthly alpha 0.49** (2.05) -0.08 (-0.41) 0.58** (2.08) 
STDEV 18.5 % 20.3 % 12.2 % 
Sharpe ratio 0.85 0.48 0.44 
Sortino ratio 5.11 2.70 2.49 
Portfolio beta 0.86 0.98 -0.12 
*** Statistically significant on a 1% level. 
** Statistically significant on a 5% level. 













Table 3. Comparison of the average payoffs 
Panel A. All stocks equally weighted 
 Value minus growth Winners minus losers 50/50 
Monthly return 1.25*** (4.12) 1.72*** (2.93) 1.48*** (4.79)   
Monthly alpha 1.39*** (4.95) 2.01*** (2.99) 1.70*** (4.73) 
STDEV 14.5 % 37.5 % 19.3 % 
Sharpe ratio 1.11 0.61 1.00 
Sortino ratio 9.87 8.89 23.82 
Portfolio beta -0.12 -0.25 
 
-0.18 
Panel B. Top third equally weighted 
 Value minus growth Winners minus losers 50/50 
Monthly return 0.44*** (1.50)  0.86*** (3.57) 0.65*** (4.94)   
Monthly alpha 0.58*** (2.08) 0.93*** (4.21) 0.75*** (4.78) 
STDEV 12.2 % 13.3 % 6.8 % 
Sharpe ratio 0.44 0.81 1.18 
Sortino ratio 2.49 4.72 9.35 
Portfolio beta -0.12 -0.06 -0.09 
*** Statistically significant on a 1% level. 
** Statistically significant on a 5% level. 














Table 4. Average payoffs of the long-only combination portfolios using 50% limits 
Top third equal weighted 
 Value and winners Value and losers Growth and winners Growth and losers 
Monthly return 1.66*** (3.95) 1.22*** (2.97) 1.68*** (3.69) 0.25 (0.56) 
 
Monthly alpha 0.72** (2.56) 0.18 (0.89) 0.61*** (2.98) -0.88*** (-4.18) 
 
STDEV 18.2 % 19.2 % 19.7 % 20.6 % 
 
Sharpe ratio 0.99    0.62    0.92    -0.01  
   
Sortino ratio 5.80 3.79 5.74 -0.07 
 
Portfolio beta 0.81 0.89 0.92 0.97 




Table 5. Average payoffs of long-short combination portfolios using 50% limits 
Top third equally weighted 
 High rank Low rank High - low 
Monthly return 1.85*** (4.84) 0.25 (0.56) 1.60*** (7.01) 
Monthly alpha 0.90*** (4.12) -0.88*** (-4.18) 1.79*** (6.87) 
STDEV 17.4 % 20.6 % 11.6 % 
Sharpe ratio 1.18 -0.02 1.81    
Sortino ratio 7.35 -0.08 16.44 
Portfolio beta 0.81 0.97 -0.17 











Table 6. Average portfolio payoffs during the Global financial crisis period from January 
2008 ̶ December 2010    



















*** Statistically significant on a 1% level. 
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Table A.1. Number of companies in the sample 
 Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Total 
Max number of 
stocks 
214 150 236 493 1052 
Min number of 
stocks 
133 100 95 164 543 
Number of stocks of 
average 
178 126 181 359 844 
Average market 
value in total M€ 
















1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017
High rank High rank - low rank Low rank Index
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Table A.2. Correlation matrix of value and momentum  





Value 1.000           
Growth 0.807 1.000         
Winners 0.829 0.938 1.000       
Losers 0.927 0.846 0.771 1.000     
Value-growth 0.175 -0.441 -0.303 -0.002 1.000   
Winners - losers -0.220 0.057 0.260 -0.415 -0.430 1.000 
 
 
Table A.3. Number of stocks in portfolios 
 Value and winners Value and losers Growth and winners Growth and losers 
Average  47 65 64 48 
Max 74 102 106 78 




Table A.4. Correlation matrix of different combination strategies 
  
High rank - low 
rank 50/50 
Value and winners - 
growth and losers Index 
High rank - low rank 1.00 
   50/50 0.90 1.00 
  Value and winners - growth and 
losers 0.94 0.89 1.00 
 Index -0.26 -0.24 -0.24 1.00 
 
